New England Business Review

Published monthly by the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of BOSTON

The Economic Impact of a Military Base

More than 120,000 servicemen and civilian employees of the Defense Department, and more than twice that number of dependents, live in New England. This is a larger work force than in either the textile or the shoe and leather industries. The regional impact of this basic employment is substantial. Small wonder that many political leaders are concerned about the possible closing of nearby defense installations for fear that the loss of employment will bring a local depression.

A recently completed study sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston suggests that the loss of any defense facility will have some depressing influence and will seriously affect certain segments of the local population and business community. At the same time the losses may be dispersed over a wide area and the total impact on the immediate locality may be less than expected.

The installation which was studied was the Pease Air Force Base in Portsmouth, N. H., established in 1955. The population in Portsmouth and the surrounding communities has grown at a rate 2 1/3 times that of the New Hampshire average. The growth rate of housing and wholesale trade has been twice that of the state. On the other hand, commercial banking, savings banking, and retail trade have shown modest growth trends. This can be explained by a number of factors.

(Continued on page 2)

Also Import Restrictions and Fuel Costs, Part II, *page 4.*
Decline in Unemployment, *page 7.*

Although Portsmouth's Pease Air Force Base employs 6,300 servicemen and civilians, much of the $24 million annual payroll its personnel spend does not enter into the local economy. A questionnaire circulated to a 5 percent sample of the 6,000 uniformed personnel shows that more than one-third of their cash income is spent within the limits of the base. Most of this money is spent at the post exchange and commissary. Another 24 percent of their income is spent beyond a 15-mile radius of the base. Only 40 percent of the total payroll is being spent for goods and services sold within the 15-mile radius.

The base has had its greatest impact in the housing market. Unlike the typical new manufacturing plant which recruits from the existing labor force in a wide commuting area, a military installation transfers large numbers of new people who must live at or near to their place of work. About half of them live off the base.

In the past 10 years the number of occupied housing units has increased 30 percent in the area surrounding the Pease Air Force Base, while the gain for New Hampshire as a whole has been only one-half as great. Of course this increase in housing has brought a similar demand for electricity, gas, and telephones.

The effect of military payrolls upon trade and services is substantially less than that of civilian consumers with comparable income. This is largely the result of spending at the commissary and post exchange where prices are 20 percent lower than in civilian stores. In addition 30 percent of the uniformed personnel are bachelors who are prone to spend their income for recreation at far distant points.

During the last five years both married and unmarried personnel have made more credit purchases than the typical consumer in the Portsmouth area. This is probably because the typical military person is relatively young. At Portsmouth-Dover merchants report that military personnel are also good credit risks. As a result, loans and mortgages of banks have increased by 50 percent since 1956.

The military installation has had less effect on other aspects of banking. Many military men use banks outside the area. Married personnel place only a fourth of their savings with local banks and the unmarried men place only 7 percent. Bank demand deposits have increased by a fourth in the Portsmouth-Dover area, as compared to one-fifth for New Hampshire over the 1955-1960 period.

Expenditures of the Air Base

During the last seven years the Defense Department has spent more than $95 million on construction at the Pease Air Force Base. Construction employment at Portsmouth was at its peak of 1,237 in 1955. Since then construction employment has drifted downward to 628.

The $14 million annual operating expenditures for items other than payroll and construction have had a more lasting influence, but only 14 percent is spent within a 15-mile radius of the base. Most of these funds are spent for equipment which is shipped in from outside the area and paid for in Washington, D.C., and other parts of the country. Only 5 percent of the commissary purchases and 10 percent of the post exchange purchases are made within a 15-mile radius of the base. Most property maintenance is by military personnel.

Of the operating expenditures made by Pease in the Portsmouth-Dover area almost one-half is for utilities and communications and one-fifth for commercial transportation. Another 27 percent is for fuel, supplies and equipment.

The net result of this pattern of expenditures is considerably different from that of some manufacturing firms which rely heavily on the nearest community for supplies and services. This is not the case in most military installations which buy military hardware in all parts of the country. Although military hardware purchases have had a great impact on the New England economy as a whole the local effect in the Portsmouth-Dover area has been limited.*

The "Multiplier"

An increase in the basic employment in any economic area brings about overall expansion in two ways. First, more people mean more spending and an increase in sales. Second, these sales create income for other persons who in turn spend. The successive spending of the same dollar in the same area creates a multiplier effect.

To measure this "multiplier" for any sector of the economy, the following formula can be used.

Total dollars spent by all those in the area after the new installation has been in operation.	(*minus*) Total sales that would "normally" be spent without the new employment.

The total dollars spent in the area by the new installation and its personnel.

The difficulty with this formula is estimating what expenditures would have been without the new employment. An estimate can be made that "normally" sales would increase (or decrease) at the same rate as similarly composed cities and towns in the same region. This estimation pro-

*See "The Defense Dollar" in the *New England Business Review* for April, 1961.

cedure is inaccurate if there have been any other "unusual" changes in employment in basic industries. For example, within a 15-mile radius of the Pease Air Force Base, there was a 10 percent increase in manufacturing employment between 1955 and 1960, bringing the total to 12,919. At the same time the nearby Navy Yard in Kittery, Maine, increased its employment by 2,129 persons. To what extent were these increases "unusual"?

There can be no precise answers to these questions, but the available data suggests that the retail trade and services expenditures (made by the base and its personnel) in the city of Portsmouth and the town of Dover had a "multiplier" impact in the range of 1.2 to 1.4. The wholesale trade multiplier in the same localities appears to have been somewhat larger – possibly 1.5. This may be because the base and its personnel buy both directly and indirectly (through increased sales of retailers) from the wholesalers.

During the 1954-1958 period total retail trade and service employment increased 5 percent in the Portsmouth-Dover labor market. This compares with a 24 percent increase during the same period in retail trade and services. This may be explained by better utilization of the existing labor force. Portsmouth has been affected before by rapid increases in military employment in the nearby Navy Yard. During World War II over 20,000 persons were stationed or working at this base. This declined to 6,761 persons in 1956. By 1958 this had increased to 7,190. This past peak employment may have brought about an increase in the "capacity" of the stores and shops in Portsmouth. Now this capacity can be more fully utilized with a very small increase in the labor force.

It should also be mentioned that this multiplier might increase over time. The multipliers calculated above were for a four-year period, 1954-1958. Many persons in Portsmouth are forced to buy specialized goods in other cities in the area or they order from Boston or New York. If this basic defense employment should be maintained indefinitely, new types of stores, services and possibly even small manufacturing plants might spring up.

The Impact on Local Government

The federal government has largely neutralized its impact on the cost of local government in the towns around Pease Air Base. For example, better than 20 percent of the school age children in the city of Portsmouth now live on the base (in federal "Capehart" housing) and the parents of 32 percent of all school children work at Pease. However, the federal government has intervened to lessen the burden on the city by building a large elementary school on the base. This school is operated by the city of Portsmouth, but the federal government reimburses the city $314 per pupil annually. In addition the federal government reimburses the city $157 per schoolchild for educating the offspring of military personnel who are attending its other public schools.

In recent years the Pease base has created yet another problem. The base is situated in what was intended to be Portsmouth's reserve ground water supply. The base has been using huge quantities of water (better than 20 percent of the water pumped by the city), and a water shortage has developed. But here again, the federal government has intervened. It has just built a separate reservoir (some 12 miles away) to supplement the municipal water supply system.

Future Needs

Defense needs determine the location and level of activity of military bases. Competitive conditions, on the other hand, control the location and operating level of manufacturing concerns. Changes in the location and amount of activity at a military installation often occur more abruptly than changes at an industrial operation.

Many air bases are now being closed down as the Defense Department puts increasing emphasis on missiles. Just recently, the Defense Department announced that it was closing down the Presque Isle Air Base at Presque Isle, Maine, affecting some 1,700 employees.

It is reassuring to find local businesses not heavily dependent on air base personnel spending because they spend a large fraction of their income on the base and at distant points. At least this much income will not be lost to the local areas if air bases are closed down.

Nevertheless, the multiplier effects of the expenditures that are made locally are substantial and are not too much lower than the short-run multiplier effect of the typical industrial plant. The closing down of any air base would have a depressing influence on the surrounding local economies. This is particularly true of the effect on real estate values and public utilities sales. Of course, the banking community, the construction industry, all types of services, and wholesale and retail trade would also lose substantially.

It is for these reasons that many communities now dependent on air base employment are trying to attract other types of basic employment into their local area. They believe that such advance planning will pay future dividends.

This article is based on a graduate thesis by Lawrence Laben at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The study was conducted with the aid of a research grant from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Copies of the complete report will be available from the bank's research department in the fall, and requests may be made at any time.

Import Restrictions and Fuel Costs, Part II

The decision to restrict the importation of crude and residual fuel oil embodied in the Presidental Proclamation of March 10, 1959, reflected a growing national concern with the increasing size of crude oil imports and our dependence on them. It was felt that in time of emergency these imports would not be available and that unless they were restricted their adverse effects on the development of the domestic oil and coal industries would preclude their necessary expansion. The decision was made, "with the aim of strengthening the national defense, providing orderly industrial growth, and assuring supplies for our expanding national economy and for any future emergency."

Although residual oil restrictions were included in the proclamation, this was a broadening of the previous voluntary restriction program which had explicitly excluded residual oil. The defense aspect of these restrictions will be studied this summer by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

Import restrictions affect primarily coastal areas, since residual fuel oil imports do not move inland. Sales of residual fuel oil to East Coast consumers, which in 1959 amounted to over 60 percent of total sales in the United States, have been slowly increasing since 1950. However, domestic production has fallen. The growing discrepancy between domestic production and sales has been counterbalanced by imports, which increased by 55 percent between 1950 and 1959. In 1958 they accounted for 62 percent of total East Coast sales.

The decrease in the supply of domestically produced residual oil results from its low sales price relative to other refined products of crude. This in turn is a reflection of the relatively greater demand for refined products, particularly gasoline and the lighter heating oils, than for residual oil. Because of this refiners, in attempting to increase their profit margins, have sought to limit the output of residual oil from each barrel of crude oil and to augment the output of the other, more valuable products. Consequently, a gap has appeared between the demand for residual oil and the domestically produced supply. As the gap widened, domestic prices began to rise and the American market became more attractive to foreign exporters with a resultant increase in the supply of foreign residual oil.

In response to a rising demand for gasoline and other refined products, East Coast refinery capacity increased by over 48 percent between 1948 and 1958. At the same time the input of crude oil to these refineries has increased. However, these increases in capacity and input have not been reflected by increases in residual oil output. Efforts by refiners to increase the output of the more valuable products has led to changes in technology which reduce the yield of the residual oil by-product. The major development has been the growth of "cracking plants" which augment the production of gasoline and other components by breaking up the residual oil into lighter, more valuable products. By 1959 these plants represented about 32 percent of the total refinery capacity on the East Coast. The ultimate improvement has been the introduction of "coking" units which reduce residual oil output to zero.

As a result of these changes both the domestically produced output of residual oil per barrel of crude and the total output of residual oil have steadily declined on the East Coast. In 1948 East Coast refiners produced 26.1 barrels of residual oil for every 100 barrels of crude refined. By 1958 the residual oil yield was down to 15.5 barrels per 100 barrels of crude. Because of this, their total output of residual oil has decreased by about 20.3 million barrels per year in the same 10-year period. This decrease has been undertaken despite a long-run rise in the price of residual oil and began at a time when imports amounted to only 27 percent of East Coast supply.

The volume of sales is usually dependent upon both the price of the product and the prices of competing products. However, despite wide fluctuations in the price of residual oil and a long-run increase in its price, year to year changes in sales have been small since 1950. This may be attributed to three causes. First, the consumer of residual oil is "locked in" because of the expense of converting to other fuels when these become relatively cheaper. This is especially true if the relative price advantage of the competing fuel is regarded as temporary. Secondly, while the price of residual oil has been rising, the price of its closest competitor, coal, has also risen. Thus, the price differential between residual oil and coal has been very small. Finally, although the use of fuels by utilities and heavy industry has grown, this increase has been reflected primarily in the growth of their purchases of natural gas. In addition the dieselization of the railroads reduced the demand for residual oil by almost 300 thousand barrels per day since the end of World War II.

With a relatively stable demand for residual fuel oil the drying up of domestic supply would tend to raise its price, other things being equal, In fact, however, there can be no substantial effect on East Coast prices unless imports are also

restricted. Otherwise, increases in domestic prices will provide the incentive for imports to keep the price increase slight. Indeed, if foreign refining expands, as in fact it has done, additional supply becomes available at no higher price.

It would seem fair to conclude that far from having caused the reduction of the domestic supply of residual oil, imports have filled the gap between domestic production and a relatively stable demand. Thus, import restrictions in the face of demonstrably decreasing domestic supply can only lead to price increases.

Imports and the National Defense

The rationale for import restrictions is closely associated with national defense. Increased dependence on foreign oil, it is felt, would seriously hamper our defense efforts in time of an emergency if for any reason these supplies were not available. Furthermore, it is argued that our present level of imports materially affects the growth and development of domestic supplies of fuels, particularly oil and coal. The former, it is held, are decreased as imports lessen the incentive for exploration thus reducing the available future supply.

The coal industry is held affected by low cost imports which by replacing coal both create a pocket of chronic unemployment and lead to a dispersal of miners and their skills which can not be easily collected if the need arises. Finally, it is felt that in a time of actual hostilities domestic supplies of residual oil and coal would be safer than foreign deliveries. It is pointed out, particularly with respect to coal, that the ocean transportation of coal supplies involves shorter distances and that an all land route is available with rail shipments. Residual oil, on the other hand, and particularly imports, must come long distances by tanker and the available number of tank cars is insufficient to transport the needed supplies from domestic sources.

Proponents of unrestricted residual oil imports generally argue that, as a by-product, sales of residual oil are not closely associated with the incentive to develop new productive capacity in oil or to explore for new reserves. They further argue that we are actually well endowed with oil resources. Oil shale is a close physical substitute for liquid petroleum and with development or in times of emergency could be economically competitive as well.

According to estimates made by the Bureau of Mines, potential reserves of shale oil amount to over 1.1 trillion barrels with exploration not nearly complete. By comparison, proved reserves of crude oil were little more than 36.7 billion barrels at the end of 1958. Applying the Bureau's estimates of the more efficient recovery methods involved in mining shale and assuming a possible 50 percent overstatement in the actual extent of these reserves, to reduce potential to proved reserves it can be estimated that the amount of oil that can be recovered from the shale already found is over 431 billion barrels while recoverable reserves of liquid crude petroleum are little better than 11 billion barrels. In other words, recoverable shale oil is about 39 times greater than that of liquid petroleum.

New reserves of liquid petroleum are constantly being discovered, although at a continually increasing cost of exploration and development. While the level of crude oil imports has been cited as a factor influencing the incentive to explore for crude oil, residual oil imports have very little effect on exploration because, as noted earlier, the domestic industry has made great efforts in a successful attempt to get out of the residual fuel oil business.

The supply of residual oil to East Coast consumers comes from three sources. Some of the oil, about 69.8 million barrels in 1958, was produced by refineries on the coast. Shipments totaling 47.5 million barrels were transported by tanker from the Gulf coast. Over 62 percent of the total supply of 312.9 million barrels was imported. Even the residual oil produced locally was originally imported as crude oil, the greater part of which came by tanker, either from Texas and Louisiana or from abroad.

In 1959 about 91 percent of East Coast residual oil imports came from Latin America, principally Venezuela and the Netherlands West Indies. An additional 5.6 percent came from Mexico while only 3.3 percent came from the Middle East, Africa and Europe combined. The East Coast's imports of crude oil also came principally from South America. In particular, 80 percent of the heavy crudes, which normally contain the highest residual oil content, came from South America.

The situation facing the United States is held to be one of cold war rather than hostilities that would merely disrupt our supply lines without becoming a large scale disaster. For this reason it is felt that the effects of a suspension of exports to the United States depend primarily on which producing area chooses or is forced to limit exports. Furthermore, it is argued that the dependence of the producing nations on oil as their sole source of foreign exchange precludes lengthy voluntary withdrawals of supply.

Proponents of unrestricted imports point out that if tanker vulnerability is judged to depend upon the distance traveled, the shortest haul between the Netherlands West Indies or Venezuela and New York City are both shorter than the shortest ocean voyage between New York and Houston, Texas. They also point out that the

bulk of the East Coast coal trade travels in ocean going coal colliers for which rail transport is an inadequate substitute.

In any event they argue that the costs of conversion prohibit their return to coal and many important consumers, such as the railroads and the shipping industry, cannot convert without reverting to pre-World War II modes of operation. Residual oil accounts for almost 20 percent of the total energy consumption in New England and, as a conservative estimate, 48 percent of all energy used by manufacturers, public utilities, the military and other large users of fuels for heating, processing raw materials, and running large machines. Costs of conversion or maintenance of standby equipment would, it is felt, foist an undue competitive liability on the East Coast users.

These proponents argue that regional distress, whether in New England or West Virginia, is a national problem but is not a defense problem and the two should not be confused.

New England is the area most vitally affected by import restrictions. Sales of residual oil in New England accounted for over 15 percent of all sales of residual oil east of the Rockies in 1959. East Coast sales, including New England, amounted to more than 72 percent of sales east of the Rockies.

The price of residual oil in New England increased about 18 cents per barrel from mid-1959 to mid-1960. At least part of this rise is generally ascribed to the restriction program. At the same time, New England pays the highest fuel rates in the nation, as exemplified by the cost of fuels consumed by its public utilities. This adverse differential has declined since the Suez crisis high in 1957, when the availability of foreign and domestic supplies of residual oil decreased and their prices rose. Even with the decline, in 1959 New England utilities were still paying 3.9 cents per million B.T.U. more than utilities in the next highest cost area, the Pacific Coast, and 10.7 cents more than the national average.

This does not mean that the price of residual oil to the utilities was highest in New England. Utilities in the central United States paid higher oil prices because they are forced to depend almost entirely on domestic sources for the residual oil. However, the cost of competing fuels such as coal and natural gas in these regions is much lower than in New England, and they depend much less on residual oil so that total fuel costs are lower. In 1959 with the exception of Iowa no state in the East North Central or West North Central states used residual oil for even 1 percent of steam-electric power generation, and Iowa used only 1 percent. The weighted average for New England utilities was more than 39 percent.

The potential effects of oil import restrictions on the coal industry can be judged on the basis of 1959 imports. If all imports of residual oil to the East Coast in 1959 had been halted, the mining of an additional 52 million tons of bituminous coal would have replaced the lost fuel supply. If the same conditions preventing imports of oil also prevented normal exports of coal and released these for domestic use, then an additional 21 million tons would have sufficed.

The employment effects of mining an additional 52 million tons of coal would vary according to whether working miners were given more days of employment or additional miners were hired. In 1959 the average miner worked 188 out of a possible 241 days or more. The first effects of the additional mining might be to raise the average number of working days to 241. If this were done, then an additional 18,000 full-time miners would be needed for the increased output. This would be an increase of about 10 percent in the number of miners employed. If, however, allowable imports were only slightly decreased, say by 15 percent, less than 3,000 additional full-time miners or 1.5 percent of the 1959 working force would be added. These estimates assume no further changes in either productivity or hours worked. Bureau of Mines data show that during the years 1947-1959, the total mine labor force decreased by 57.1 percent, or an average of 4.7 percent per year, while production went down by 34.7 percent.

Oil import restrictions involve many problems of conflicts of interests. The impacts, both positive and negative, vary according to geographic area and economic activity. Evaluation of the results of import restriction must involve economic, defense and other basic considerations. These conditions have led several responsible groups to suggest the desirability of Congressional or Administration committees to re-examine our national fuels policy.

New England Economic Almanac

A compilation of statistics on the New England economy has been published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The *New England Economic Almanac* draws together in one publication current and past statistics in such areas as employment, income, finance, construction, and population. The current publication is a revision of the *Almanac* published in 1957. Copies of the 1961 *Almanac* are available free of charge from the bank's public information department.

Decline in Unemployment

Unemployment in New England has been declining in recent weeks as more and more signs point to a strengthening business recovery. Part of the decrease is the result of seasonal expansion of job opportunities, especially in agriculture, construction and other outdoor activities. While unemployment has decreased in actual numbers and in the proportion of the work force, it remains substantially higher by both measures than a year ago in about all parts of the region and is a serious problem in many localities.

Early in 1961 state agencies in New England began making estimates of total unemployment on a monthly basis for each of the New England states. Formerly, the best unemployment indicator available for the region was the volume of insured unemployment. Not all of the unemployed are eligible for insurance benefits for a variety of reasons – they may not have worked in jobs covered by the insurance program, they may have already exhausted their benefits, they may be seeking work for the first time or after voluntarily leaving a job and thus not eligible for benefits. The new statistics broaden coverage to include these and other types of unemployed. In addition to the current series, estimates of total unemployment were also made for each month of 1960.

The number of persons without jobs but seeking work reached the high point of the business cycle in New England in February when unemployment was estimated at 360,500. This represented 8.2 percent of the region's work force. In March through May unemployment decreased, as is usually the case at this time of year, as job opportunities expanded, especially in seasonally affected industries. In May unemployment totaled some 285,000, about 6.4 percent of the work force. This was about 58,500 more than in the comparable month a year ago when unemployment for the region was estimated at 226,400 and the rate of unemployment at about 5.2 percent. Since the middle of last year the relative amount of unemployment in the region has been very close to the rate for the nation.

Nonagricultural employment increased seasonally in the spring months and a further rise is expected by mid-year. Seasonal expansion in outdoor and vacation activities combined with the continued expansion in service industries will be the principal sources of additional jobs.

Weekly insured unemployment and new claims for unemployment benefits have declined along with total unemployment. The number of New England jobless workers drawing unemployment benefits reached the peak of the business recession in February when benefits under regular programs were paid to about 237,000. During the last week in May the number had been reduced to about 161,000. This was still substantially higher than the 127,000 collecting benefits in the comparable period last year. At its high insured unemployment was not as large as in the 1958 recession but was well above the peak of the 1954 business recession.

Since mid-April weekly claims for new unemployment have been declining steadily. By the end of May there were about the same number of new claimants for unemployment benefits as there were a year earlier.

Recent studies have pointed out that the persistently high level of unemployment nationally has been in part caused by the inability to expand employment opportunities rapidly enough to absorb the increase in the labor force. The New England experience has been similar. While unemployment in New England increased by about 58,500 from the year ago level, the work force has increased by an estimated 48,400. No monthly estimates on total employment are available for the region, but nonagricultural employment showed a decrease of only 22,500 from May last year.

Depressed Areas

Some further improvement in unemployment conditions has taken place in most of the nation's major labor market areas recently surveyed by the U. S. Department of Labor. All of the 17 major New England areas continue to be classified in May as areas of moderate to substantial unemployment. Unemployment in these areas accounted for nearly two-thirds of all unemployment in New England in March, the latest month for which area data are available.

In addition to the insured unemployment statistics noted earlier, data on labor market areas also show that the recent recession was less severe than in 1958 but more severe than in 1954. The number of New England major labor market areas suffering from substantial unemployment at the early 1961 cyclical peak was about the same as at the peak of the 1958 recession and considerably more than in the 1954 recession months. However there were fewer smaller areas in this high unemployment group early this year than in 1958. Even when unemployment was at its recent high point, there were no major areas in the region with 12 percent or more of the labor force jobless. In 1958 close to a third of the larger areas were suffering from severe unemployment.

EMPLOYMENT–UNEMPLOYMENT



MANUFACTURING



MANUFACTURING INDEXES (seasonally adjusted)	MASSACHUSETTS (1950–52 = 100)			NEW ENGLAND (1950–52 = 100)			UNITED STATES (1957 = 100)		
	May '61	Apr. '61	May '60	May '61	Apr. '61	May '60	May '61	Apr. '61	May '60
All Manufacturing	114	110	120	116	113	118r	108	105r	110r
Primary Metals	105	98	97	98	92	85	91	82	94r
Textiles	48	46	49	68	67	70	n.a.	106	113r
Shoes and Leather	142	130	127	135	122	115	n.a.	n.a.	104
Paper	107	107	111	123	125	129	n.a.	116	113r

	NEW ENGLAND	Percent Change from:		UNITED STATES	Percent Change from:	
	May '61	Apr. '61	May '60	May '61	Apr. '61	May '60
BANKING AND CREDIT						
Commercial and Industrial Loans ($ millions) (Weekly Reporting Member Banks)	1,472	+ 2	+ 4	31,727	0	+ 2
Deposits ($ millions) (Weekly Reporting Member Banks)	4,577r	0	+ 6	114,838	+ 2	+ 8
Check Payments ($ millions) (Selected Cities)	10,581	+15	+18	268,932	+17	+15
Consumer Installment Credit Outstanding (index, seas. adj. 1950–52 = 100)	264.6	− 1	+ 5	285.1	0	+ 2
TRADE						
Department Store Sales (index, seas. adj. 1947–49 = 100)	133	+ 1	+ 6	144r	− 3	+ 1
Department Store Stocks (index, seas. adj. 1947–49 = 100)	152	+ 2	+ 4	164	+ 1	+ 2
EMPLOYMENT, PRICES, MAN-HOURS, & EARNINGS						
Nonagricultural Employment (thousands)	3,672	+ 1	− 1	52,536	+ 1	− 1
Insured Unemployment (thousands) (excl. R. R. and temporary programs)	174	−17	+27	2,382	−17	+39
Consumer Prices (index, 1947–49 = 100)	130.1 (Mass.)	0	+ 1	127.4	0	+ 1
Production-Worker Man-Hours (index, 1950 = 100)	83.5	+ 1	− 4	92.1	+ 2	− 6
Weekly Earnings in Manufacturing ($)	84.67 (Mass.)	+ 1	+ 3	92.66	+ 1	+ 1
OTHER INDICATORS						
Construction Contract Awards ($ thous.) (3-mos. moving averages Mar., Apr., May)						
Total	165,832	+33	+ 6	3,316,811	+15	+ 2
Residential	78,227	+35	+13	1,458,721	+19	+ 4
Public Works	27,056	+48	+44	627,831	+14	+10
Electrical Energy Production (index, seas. adj. 1947–49 = 100)	230	+ 2	+ 7	289	0	+ 4
Business Failures (number)	61	+17	+ 3	1,545	+ 7	+21
New Business Incorporations (number)	1,009	+13	+ 8	16,371	+11	+ 5

n.a. = not available

r = revised